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Two decades ago Judge Jerome Frank published his arresting book,
"Law and the Modern Mind." It came off the press at a time when men
were stunned and reeling from the early effects of a great financial collapse,
the repercussions of which were being felt throughout the land. It was
natural in those hectic days that a distraught populace should welcome
convenient scape-goats on which to heap blame for their misfortunes. None
could have been more acceptable than the one here offered up in the com-
bined form of lawyers, courts and the legal system in general, especially
when it was being haled to the altar of public opinion by one who himself
belonged to that profession. When a member of the bar yearns for loud
applause he can readily satisfy his appetite by roundly scoring his own pro-
fession. The public relishes this spectacle, and responds liberally.
Judge Frank's book created a profound impression, bordering almost
on a sensation. It was widely read and quoted. It became a sort of inspired
text for those who regarded themselves as legal "liberals" and "realists."
Here indeed was to be found an uncovering of some of the basic causes
of society's ills. While the book in no way charged the legal fraternity with
responsibility for the economic depression, it did charge them with about
everything else. It abounds in such terms as "hypocrisy," "delusion," "de-
ception," "myth," "childishness" and the like.
The natural result was a decided impetus given that heterogeneous
school which for years had been using Holmesian epigrams in attacking
current legal thinking. Their attacks were intensified, their barbs were
sharpened. They did not agree among themselves, nor did they offer any
common substitute for that which they so caustically criticized. In fact one
great apostle of legal "realism," Walter Wheeler Cook, boldly stated the
position of himself and his followers thus: "Having given up the quest
for certainty, we have no guaranties to offer." Their insistence was that
we must rid ourselves of standards in the law, even though these demolition
experts had no substitute to bring forth.
Shortly after the appearance of Judge Frank's volume, as you well
know, a political upheaval occurred in this country that vitally affected
not only the executive branch of our government, but the legislative and
judicial branches as well. The crusade was carried on under the banner
of "liberalism," and to that banner repaired in great numbers those who
would reshape our laws as well as our institutions. In venturing to discuss
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before you this thing I have called the "liberal mind," it is not my purpose
to deal with its effects upon either the executive or legislative departments
of government. To do the first would, of course, lead us into a purely
political discussion which would hardly be appropriate for this occasion.
To undertake the latter would lead us far afield into ramifications of legis-
lative policies. It will suffice to say on these points that the average
citizen is now convinced that a "liberal" in politics or in the legislative field
is merely one who believes in the liberal squandering of public money.
What I am interested in specifically, and what I want to talk to you
about, is the impact of the so-called "liberal mind" upon our law through
the courts, its discernible effects upon the output of the judicial branch of
government.
I am aware that when one launches upon a discourse the title of which
is couched in abstract terms, he should properly begin by giving his defi-
nition of those terms, so that his hearers may at least have some inkling of
what he is driving at. To follow this precept would mean that I must
start by defining "law," and that I decline to do. Every lawyer and student
of jurisprudence will sympathize with my shunning that futile task. Judge
Frank, in his book already alluded to, undertook to give his definition of
law. He has recently written that such an attempt was a serious blunder
on his part. The trouble is that no satisfactory definition of law has ever
been worked out. Fortunately, that fact does not preclude our considering
particular aspects of law as manifested in its workings. It is to one of those
manifestations that I direct your attention, to wit, that aspect of law dis-
closed in judicial decisions. Whether this is a process of applying pre-exist-
ing law, or making law, or merely deciding controversies without law, are
questions we are not now called upon to answer. It is enough to say that
what I am here speaking of is law in the sense of court adjudications.
The other abstract part of my title is the "liberal mind," and I confess
it is even more undefinable than is the first part, so much so that one would
despair of dealing with it except out of sheer necessity. When a term is
appropriated into common usage we are forced to try to find its meaning,
especially when it is directly related to that which vitally concerns our
happiness and well-being. Today, when a judge dies or resigns, or a suc-
cessor is appointed to the bench, the first point of discussion appears to be
whether the court has lost or gained a "liberal." This very fact denotes that
far-reaching implications are involved. The liberal mind, it is conceived,
must profoundly affect our law in the final output of judicial decisions; and
this effect stems not alone from the mind of the judge on the bench, but also
from the thinking of counsel before the bar, of legal educators who have
had to do with the training of counsel, and of public opinion itself. It is
time, therefore, that we began carefully to scrutinize this bent of mind, if
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haply we may come to understand that which may be shaping our very
destinies.
I began by harking back to a book published twenty years ago. I did
so largely because it is one of the earlier valuable side-lights on the make-up
of the liberal mind as applied to law. While the cult of legal liberals would
not endorse all that Judge Frank had to say (and, as I shall later point
out, he himself no longer endorses much of it), the book was so avidly
seized upon by professed followers of this school of thought that we are
justified in looking to it for insight into the workings of these minds. That
the text continues to serve its original purpose is shown by the fact that it
has now gone through six unrevised printings, the last of which appeared
only a few months ago.
Those of you familiar with the work will recall that the author begins
with a chapter entitled "The Basic Myth". The nature of this myth, as
Judge Frank portrays it, is a vulgar notion, cleverly sought to be kept alive
by lawyers "through elaborate pretense," that there exist established and
predictable rules of law dealing with human relations. He goes further and
argues that the existence of such rules is socially undesirable. This theme
runs throughout the book, and leads, of course, to a cynical attack, in the
chapter entitled "Illusory Precedents," directed against "stare decisis". This
attack culminates in a foot note which the author saw fit to have printed
in italics, which reads as follows:
"On the continent there is a movement in favor of free legal
decision which emphasizes the subjective sense of justice inherent
in the judge. The question is not whether we shall adopt free
legal decision but whether we shall admit we already have it."
Those words were written originally in 1930 at which time the author
was holding up the example of courts in Europe which were soon to show
the world just what "free legal decision" and a judge's "subjective sense
of justice" could do to people in Germany and Italy.
Constitutional limitations are lightly brushed aside by the author as
"self-delusions," and practically meaningless. By implication at least, he
derides the concept of "Natural Law," and in more direct and virulent
fashion trains his batteries against "Scholasticism." In short he stands for
personalized justice, personally arrived at.
Of course, Judge Frank was not the lone expounder of such views, nor
did he run or undertake to run the entire gamut of the "liberal mind" in
law. Other voluble spokesmen by their writings shed further light. Time
will not permit detailed review of these, but at least one or two common
themes deserve mention.
The liberal mind is apparently resentful of that American doctrine of
judicial review whereunder our courts assert the right to hold invalid those
legislative enactments deemed violative of our written constitutions. This
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"usurpation of authority," as it has been styled, is anathema to the legal
liberal. Volumes have been written to prove that such authority was never
vested in the courts, and to establish the contrary doctrine of legislative
supremacy.
Again, the liberal mind in its view of the judicial process goes beyond
bare personalized justice. It apparently claims for courts a sort of "dynamic
creative statesmanship" that should mould their decisions (unhampered by
rules, prior decisions, or constitutional limitations) to fit what are deemed
currently desirable or desired economic, political and social ends.
Within this all too brief compass I have sought as fairly as I can to
present what would seem to be characteristic predilections of what is
commonly known as liberal legal thinking. To attempt to go into detail or
to exhaust the subject would be to exhaust ourselves.
With these preliminary understandings settled, we may now proceed
to the real subject of this inquiry, to wit, what has been the effect of this
type of mind upon our law as disclosed in judicial decisions? That there
has been an effect cannot be denied, for following the political upheaval
already referred to, the liberal mind was liberally projected onto the
bench as well as into other departments of American life. This is a fitting
time to take stock, at the turn of the half-century mark and after the
lapse of a decade or more of dominance of legal liberalism and realism.
You and I as citizens, whose lives and property and happiness are directly
concerned, are entitled to know just what has been the effect of this mind
upon the administration of justice. It behooves us to try to find out.
To get at some sort of definite appraisal it is fair to focus attention
upon our highest Court, the Supreme Court of the United States, for here
is a judicial tribunal which with the passing of time has been purged, or
presumably was meant to be purged, of all non-liberal minds. Its workings
may be contrasted with those of the so-called conservative courts that pre-
ceded it. I realize that there sat on the old Court two men, Holmes and
Brandeis, who were well-nigh idolized by the liberals, but even they did
not entirely fit the pattern, for Holmes had an unfortunate way of bowing
to a decision of the Court once it had been rendered, even though he had
previously dissented; while Brandeis had at times indulged in such heresies
as talk about the individual's right to be let alone, even at the hands of
his own government, and about government's being most dangerous when
it appeared most benevolent! Time duly removed even these obstructions
to progress, so that by the opening of the present decade liberals could
point with pride to a reconstituted Court which would usher in a new
judicial era.
You may recall that one of the strongest points pressed against the old
Court, at the time when the liberal mind was demanding admission, was
that the nine old men had so frequently disagreed among themselves that
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by their own admissions they did not know the rules they were professing
to administer. The number of split decisions was held up as an ominous sign
of judicial impotence and as a cause for undermining confidence in the
vital function of the administration of justice.. You have but to review the
record of that great fight on the Court to see how strongly this ground
for attack was advanced. By inference the argument was that if nine
liberal minds could be brought together on the Court, all would be serene,
they would move in parallel channels, and virtual unanimity would be
achieved, so that the citizen would with confidence know what to expect
at the hands of the Court. This sounds highly amusing in the light of what
has come to pass. The plain facts are these: In 1930, under the old
Court 10 per cent of the Court's judgments were rendered by split decisions;
today such decisions have risen to approximately 66 per cent. Not only is
the Court now divided in the big majority of cases decided, but these
cleavages are at times marked by displays of temper and vituperation that
would scarcely befit the decorum of the court of a police judge or a justice
of the peace. Obviously, the liberal mind is not as settled, as serene, or as
productive of public confidence as originally portrayed. If a so-called
conservative court was incompetent because it split 10 per cent of the time,
one is at a loss for words to describe a judicial tribunal that disagrees with-
in itself two-thirds of the time. The cause for this disagreement is some-
thing that must be inquired into. It cannot result from lack of intelligence,
for these are educated men; it cannot result from improper motives, for
these are honorable men; it cannot result from sheer laziness, for these are
conscientious men who devote hours of hard labor and reams of paper to
the exposition of their views. I have my own explanation of the cause, and
I submit it to you. These constant divisions result from the liberal mind's
misconception of the proper function of a court. Instead of working toward
the establishment and the application of more or less uniform rules, the
Court in its decisions is primarily concerned with not only personalized
but also socialized justice, and with what has been euphoniously called judi-
cial creative statesmanship. These considerations lead to all shades of opinion
and to hopeless disagreements. When judges undertake to enter the fields
of economics, sociology and political science so as to mould decisions into
results deemed currently desirable, they are headed for bitter conflicts in
opinions. Those are matters about which men hotly differ.
Moreover, a tribunal that functions in that manner ceases to be a court
according to the Anglo-American concept. It is some other kind of institu-
tion, more like that found on the continent of Europe and which Judge
Frank deemed worthy of emulation some years back.
In his recent book entitled "The Law of the Soviet State," Mr. Vishin-
sky has said that a court is merely another implement of a dominant class
to be used in advancing its interests, that is, in furthering the social and
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economic policies of those in control of the state. He denounces as utterly
false the bourgeois theory that courts are "organs above classes and apart
from politics."
When the liberal mind casts aside legal rules and standards, and by
"free decision" decides litigation in accordance with what appears to be
socially desirable from the point of view of the currently dominant class,
it begins to look as if the Vishinsky definition of a court, or something
closely akin thereto, were being adopted.
Of course, all this means that the doctrine of "stare decisis" must go.
On this direct point the Supreme Court is not committed. The record
does disclose that in the twelve year period of 1937-1949, the reconstituted
Court overruled thirty prior decisions, which was almost double the bare
seventeen overruled in the thirty year period of 1860-1890. Two of the
justices are well known to hold little if any regard for the rule of "stare
decisis," especially with respect to constitutional questions. Other members
of the Court in extra-judicial utterances have paid it some degree of lip
service. But in the light of the record it can now be said that this liberal
minded Court does not feel itself bound by earlier decisions, whether
rendered by itself or by its predecessors. This attitude led to the well known
outbursts of the then Mr. Justice Roberts in 1944. In Mahnich vs. Southern
S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96, he said:
"The tendency to disregard precedents in the decision of
cases like the present has become so strong in this Court of late
as, in my view, to shake confidence in the consistency of decision
and leave the courts below on an uncharted sea of doubt and
difficulty without any confidence that what was said yesterday will
hold good tomorrow."
In Smith vs. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, after making use of the stinging
simile of a restricted railroad ticket, good for one day and one train only,
he added:
"I have no assurance in view of current decisions that the
opinion announced today may not shortly be repudiated and
overruled by justices who deem they have new light upon the sub-
ject."
Surely, if independence of established legal rules, if freedom from the
constraints of prior decisions, if entanglements in the meshes of social,
political and economic trends, are the ear-marks of a liberal minded court,
then the present Supreme Court of the United States has qualified. It
ought to delight the soul of Judge Frank. But it does not delight him,
for reasons I shall presently point out. Before doing so, however, there is
another feature of the workings of our Supreme Court we must consider.
As I have already mentioned, exponents of the liberal mind for years
devoted some of their bitterest utterances to denouncing judicial review and
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to upholding the doctrine of legislative supremacy as against the courts and
the Constitution. Books and articles were turned out, addresses were made
and campaigns were waged, against this thing labeled a bold and unwar-
ranted assumption of power by our courts. That occurred before the liberal
mind became dominant on the Supreme Court. One was led to believe
that once the liberals gained control of the Court we should revert im-
mediately to the excellencies of the British constitution whereunder Parlia-
ment is supreme and no right of judicial review exists. But a strange thing
has happened. This liberal Court continues to declare some legislative en-
actments and ordinances invalid, and to strike them down as violative of
due process or other constitutional guaranties. Such a course has produced
a strange silence in the liberal camp. We no longer have diatribes against
this form of "judicial usurpation." The wind seems to have been removed
from this portion of the sails. It obviously would not do to have the
Court placed under attack by members of their own school of thought.
There is something stranger still. The liberal minded Court has developed
a sort of selective process whereby it will protect some constitutional guaran-
ties against legislative action and not others. Now, it would seem clear that
the doctrine of judicial review must apply to the entire Constitution or not
at all. By what process of reasoning can it possibly be said that a sovereign
people who have carefully written into their Constitution clauses to protect
themselves against governmental interference, meant that courts should
select and choose which of those protecting clauses they will give effect to?
Yet, that kind of selecting is exactly what the Supreme Court now engages
in. We must look into the nature of this electicism.
In a recent case Mr. Justice Douglas frankly said:
"Courts must balance the various community interests in pass-
ing on the constitutionality of local regulations of the character
involved here. But in that process they should be mindful to
keep the freedoms of the First Amendment in a preferred position."
(334 U. S. 558).
The opinion embodying this pronouncement was concurred in by a
majority of the justices. Opposed to this view is the striking dissent of
Mr. Justice Jackson:
"I disagree entirely with the idea that courts must balance
the various community interests in passing on the constitutionality
of local regulations of the character involved here. It is for the
local communities to balance their own interests-that is poli-
tics-and what the courts should keep out of. Our only function
is to apply constitutional limitations."
Here is a clue to what the liberal minded Supreme Court is doing on
this subject. It has no intention of giving up the right of judicial review
with respect to certain parts of the Constitution, such as those embodied
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in the First Amendment. Here, thinks the Court, is a field for its judicial
statesmanship, for its furtherance of currently desirable political and social
ends. In recent years much attention has been devoted to civil liberties by
minority groups and by politicians seeking their support. Conditions in
Europe accentuated the emphasis given to these phases of human liberties.
They have become a popular political slogan. The Court apparently takes
pride in defending them against all legislative encroachments. But, the
old, orthodox liberal need not despair, for the Court is following him part
way. It will accord to legislative bodies practically unrestrained license to
deprive the citizen of his property and to interfere with his economic activi-
ties. In this area the Court clothes itself with robes of true liberalism, and
spurns the idea that it should interfere with a coordinate branch of govern-
ment.
Thus it appears that the liberal mind on the Court is really running
true to form. The use of the judicial function to attain desired social,
political and economic ends, is paramount to any notion of enforcing or
applying established rules and standards, or to giving effect to the Constitu-
tion as a whole. Right now those ends are closely related to so-called civil
liberties, and these the Court means to defend, even as against hostile legis-
lation. The citizen may well wonder what good will these intangible rights
do him, if meanwhile he is despoiled of his means of subsistence and his
enjoyment of the fruits of his labor. Such a citizen, of course, is lacking in
proper appreciation of the liberal mind.
Now, to return to our author, Judge Frank. One might think that
having lived to witness the fruition of all his preachments, he could now
see "everything that he had made, and behold it was very good." Not so,
for he tells us by his own pen that he either did not mean much of what he
preached, or he now no longer believes it.
In this sixth printing of "Law and the Modem Mind" which has
recently appeared, Judge Frank begins with a newly written preface of
some twenty pages wherein he makes some exceedingly frank confessions.
In this preface he states that if he had it to do over again he would not now
write the book "precisely" as it was written. He protests at length that he
did not mean to deprecate legal rules and standards, or to hold up for scorn
their uncertainty and unpredictability; on the contrary, he now says that
the only uncertainty he was writing about was that which is involved in
the fact-finding process in trial courts, which renders the outcome of
litigation highly unpredictable. If this was the underlying theme of the
book, then the author wasted considerable time and effort on that which
is well known to everyone who has had even remote connection with litiga-
tion. Just how the facts will ultimately appear and how they will be found
by the tribunal, are obviously results that no one can accurately foresee. To
say that the fact-finding body's final decision is unpredictable is a truism.
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Witnesses may die or disappear, they may be discredited, or they may be
found to be honestly mistaken. No doubt, there are faults and defects in
the fact-finding process that might be remedied. There always will be,
as long as human agencies must be relied upon. The trouble with Judge
Frank's present effort to explain away the text which he again gives to the
public is that it will not support the narrow interpretation he now seeks to
engraft upon it. The text as written is replete with references to legal
"rules," and that does not mean mere fact-finding.
When it comes to "stare decisis" Judge Frank is now quick to affirm
his faith in that doctrine, despite anything to the contrary in the text.
Thus, he writes in the new preface:
"This doctrine demands that, when a court has laid down-
expressly or by implication-a rule in one case, the court should,
except in unusual circumstances, apply that rule to later cases
presenting substantially similar facts... Yet no sane informed per-
son will deny that, within appropriate limits, judicial adherence to
precedents possesses such great value that to abandon it would be
unthinkable."
Just how Judge Frank means to square this language of the new
preface with the reissued text of the chapter on "Illusory Precedents," and
the note on "free legal decision," he does not bother to explain.
In further expiation of what he now acknowledges to be other errors
in the book he states that his references therein to Scholasticism and
to Aristotle are "superficial," "unfair" and "glib," for which he has apolo-
gized and sought to make amends in other writings.
To correct any aspersions he may have cast upon the Natural Law
he inserts the following:
"I want now to say this: I do not understand how any decent
man today can refuse to adopt as the basis of modem civilization,
the fundamental principles of Natural Law, relative to human
conduct, as stated by Thomas Aquinas."
In the light of recent world events and the necessary resort to principles
of natural justice in international affairs, the writer has evidently come to
realize the error of his sophisticated jibe at Blackstone's deference to
Natural Law.
The amazing thing is that in this year of 1949, Judge Frank has re-
issued the book with a revised preface, but with no revision in the text.
I am interested in his confession of errors as set out in that new preface,
not because it must come as a shock, if not an affront, to his erstwhile
fellow liberals, but because more significant implications are involved.
If we are to take the original text and the new preface at face value, then
it is clear that Judge Frank's views have altered since 1930. He is no
longer the liberal he once was. One can but admire his confession of that
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fact, even if it be encumbered to some extent with circumlocutions. When
such a reversal takes place in the thinking of one who began by drawing
to himself such a high degree of public attention, we are warranted in
seeking an explanation for the change. An obvious answer might be that
Judge Frank is now a man of more maturity and of far more experience
than he was twenty years ago. Then he was a young though brilliant mem-
ber of the bar. Today he is a seasoned jurist, having for the past eight
years sat as an appellate judge on an important Federal Court. He has
now had time and opportunity to test his earlier incursions into legal
liberalism.
I venture to believe, however, that there may well exist a sounder
explanation, whether it will be admitted or not. No open-minded, fair-
minded seeker after truth can view the output of the present Supreme
Court, liberal minded as it avowedly is without being appalled at the chaos
to which we have been brought. If this is what legal liberalism is to mean,
then the administration of justice is indeed in a sorry plight. Honest
thinking liberals must now be impressed with some realization of what their
creed has done to our law. Perhaps this has begun to dawn upon Judge
Frank. If so, it is going to take more than apologies and confessions to
rectify the unhappy situation. How that is to be accomplished is not within
the scope of my subject. What I have tried to do is to lay before you a
simple statement of the true nature of the liberal legal mind, coupled with a
showing of how it affects law as disclosed in the workings of our highest
Court. Truly, the result is a deplorable one. If legal liberals are disposed
to face the situation honestly, they will join Judge Frank in a forthright
repudiation of much of their specious sophistry, and unite in a common
demand that our courts return to their true function of applying established
rules and following fixed principles in the administration of justice. To
depart therefrom can only lead to Mr. Vishinsky's concept of a court.
